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The Pure Moment Of Murder 
The Symbolic Function of Bodily Interactions in Horror Films 
Steve Jones 
 
As a popular genre, horror has been tarnished with the reputation of being “lowbrow” (Hawkins 
2000, 2007; Hellerman 2004: 225). It is my contention that the visceral horror film should be regarded 
as more philosophically pertinent than such a dismissal would suggest. Horror that is focused on the 
body is constituted by literal instances of trauma, and these, I argue, have metaphoric significance. 
In my reading of the horror film, moments of physical violence that incur on the body demonstrate 
(albeit in an augmented, hyperbolic manner) a number of long-standing problems that continue to 
fuel philosophical discussion regarding the nature of selfhood. Here I concur with Stephen Mulhall’s 
(2002:2) view that popular cinema can act as “philosophy in action.” Narrative examples concretize 
and allow me to work through the same puzzles of selfhood raised in philosophy. If cultural 
psychology seeks to define the self relative to its cultural setting (which shapes self-conception), my 
argument for the horror film is that it is equally important to consider how cultural manifestations 
reflect and articulate some of the problems of self, 
In cinema, selfhood is represented by images of bodies. Ergo, spirits typically appear in 
anthropomorphized forms in horror fiction, indicating that the body image has become synonymous 
with the conception of selfhood, and vice versa. The body—at least in its cultural objectification—
stands in for a conceptual unity and integrity of self. The “contingency of the I,” following Descartes, 
is popularly considered to be comprised of “a structured pair of my body and something else,” which is 
abstract or intangible (Castaneda 1994: 165), the latter being rooted in an experience of being. 
Although I will go on to contest the conclusion that “[t]he realm of the mental is radically different 
from the physical” (Erneling 2009:172), for the moment it is sufficient to note that as a two-
dimensional representation, cinema condenses that apparently dualistic access to self into a visual 
emblem. This condensation may fail to adequately capture the way in which we experience ourselves 
as embodied, yet it does reflect the way in which we perceive other selves. 
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Because we are embodied, we can never access the Other’s thoughts and feelings, and we rely on 
language or the Other’s bodily gestures in order to comprehend their emotional states (Erneling 
2009:172). Although I am not convinced that we have to necessarily divide body and mind, I agree 
with the problem that follows, which interested Descartes as much as it does “much of contemporary 
psychology” (Erneling 2009:173): we exist as social beings, but can never truly know each other as 
intimately as we can know ourselves. Our ability to understand each other via physical gestures, 
language, and bodily signs might appear inadequate in that sense (see McGann and De Jaegher 2009: 
417) 
For me, this is the horror of selfhood. Our relationship with the world and each other is limited to our 
embodied field of experience. The anxieties that arise as a result are subject to cultural investigation 
via fictions that revolve around individuals. Horror, I contend, is particularly useful in exploring those 
tensions by placing individuals under duress, threatening them with destruction. In the horror film, 
the body—that which physically manifests the self— is frequently disturbed: most commonly, the 
boundaries that declare the body to be “whole,” “functional,” or “normal” are subjected to literal 
deconstruction. This deconstruction can be articulated via, for example, the bodily decimation caused 
by Saw’s traps (seven films, made between 2004 and 2010); the genital anomalies of Teeth (2007), 
Bad Biology (2008), or One-Eyed Monster (2008) (murder occurring via intimate bodily contact); or 
even by the rape and revenge—both of which incur upon the body and disturb the self—of I Spit on 
Your Grave (1978, remade in 2010). 
Self-boundaries—corporeal (literal) and mental (metaphysical)—are disturbed during the eruptions 
of violence that characterize visceral horror movies. Instead of focusing on a particular film, my case 
study here is a particular type of visual incident that occurs in a variety of horror films, which I term 
the “pure moment of murder.” That said, for the sake of coherence I will limit my study to American 
horror drawing particularly on two sub-genres that centralize explicit depictions of homicide. The 
first is the slasher cycle, which will allow me to draw on “classic” examples as well as their recent 
counterparts, and the contemporary body of films that have been dubbed “torture porn.”1 
An example will help me illustrate the characteristics of the pure moment of murder. In the climactic 
sequence of A Nightmare on Elm Street Part 3: Dream Warriors (1987), Freddy thrusts his razor-
gloved hand into Nancy’s torso. Moments later, in order to save her friends, the near-dead Nancy 
defeats Freddy in exactly the same way, using his own weapon against him. These parallel actions 
are portrayed in two-shots that isolate these bodies from the other characters present. The dual 
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incidents depict Freddy’s razor fingers penetrating first Nancy’s, then Freddy’s body, joining the two 
figures. We find similar couplings in any instance of contact murder (as opposed to non-proximate 
homicide, such as shooting) occurring on film and represented in two-shots. Another example is 
found in Hatchet (2006), whereby the murders of Jim, then Shannon, are framed in two-shots: Victor 
first cleaves Jim in two with an axe, and then rips Shannon’s head open with his bare hands. 
In the case of the latter especially, it becomes difficult to envisage a point of separation between the 
two bodies, to establish where the body that bleeds ends and where the body bled upon begins. As 
a two-dimensional form, there is no apparent division between adjoining bodies on film; once they 
forge this kind of unified presence, they are inextricable, visually speaking. Any separation between 
supposed individual bodies is an illusion once they enter the frame and engage with one another. 
That is to say, during their bloody combination there are no clear boundaries between the bodies 
that previously appeared to be separate. More than just visualizing the opened body, in the instant 
of contact-murder, the two figures are merged into one; a gruesome twinship. One of the reasons this 
is so abhorrent is not only be-cause it results in the destruction of an individual, but also because it 
involves the combination of two bodies; the self is limited to a singular body, and thus the momentary 
melding disturbs that fundamental premise of being, depicting the combination of bodies as a 
moment of terror. This abutment may last only a fraction of a second, but the instance is pivotal 
because it is the center-piece of this type of horror film. 
As Vivian Sobchack has theorized, even the portrayal of “senseless and violent and horrible” death 
reveals “a moment of truth ... an internal order” which eases “the movement of the body toward 
nonbeing” by imbuing it with “meaning” (2000:119). In this article, I investigate aspects of that 
“meaning,” considering what the collusion of bodies in the pure moment of murder signifies about 
the nature of selfhood. 
A final caveat is necessary before I begin. In this article, I am exclusively interested in murder. 
Although erotic couplings bring bodies together, sex does not destroy the body, which is the central 
point of interest to my pure moment of murder hypothesis. Rape (an attack forced on the body of 
the Other) is a different matter: though there are clear parallels between rape and murder that are 
befitting to my premise, rape does not usually cause death. In my current theory, it makes little 
difference whether the killer and victim are male or female; though much scholarship has focused on 
gendered power within the slasher film (see, e.g., Clover 1993), such an investigation is beyond the 
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scope of the work in hand. This article will act as a springboard for specific discussions of gendered 
power, selfhood, and sexual violence elsewhere. 2 
 
Body, Self, and Other 
What I have started to develop is the way in which horror films manifest (however exaggeratedly) 
some of the philosophical problems of selfhood. Be-fore going any further in analyzing the films 
themselves, it is vital to discuss precisely what those problems are, and where I position myself in 
relation to contemporary philosophical debates that regard selfhood as a problem. In-deed, Schlicht 
et al. note that there are a variety of responses to this puzzle, yet they find it “questionable whether 
we can dispense with the notion of self altogether” (2009: 688), as the paradigm is the founding 
concept underpinning our understanding of existence. 
Let us begin with the non-physical aspect of self-experience. We might term this element the “mind” 
if using a Cartesian model; however, for reasons that will soon become apparent, I choose to use the 
term “identity” instead. In making this distinction, I seek to overcome Michel Henry’s (1988) 
problematic defense of the Cartesian principle “I think therefore I am,” whereby he claims that the 
mind would continue to exist without the presence of Others (his position has come under scrutiny 
recently for the same reasons I outline here [Alweiss 2009]). I agree that “the mind” would exist 
without sociality. How-ever, identity (the self’s identification of its uniqueness) would not, because 
identity is defined by the presence of Others. Alweiss does not make this terminological distinction, 
but I concur with her Husserlian critique of Henry’s position: “[t]he ipseity of the self only becomes 
meaningful in the presence of the world and other selves. Without the other I have no sense of a self; 
indeed, I have no sense of what makes me distinct” (Alweiss 2009: 428; see also Datsur 1996: 7; 
Strawson 1997: 405). Without Others, “self” becomes redundant as a label, because identity (inner self-
conception) is only necessary to demarcate the self. 
Identity is thus located according to the social environment that situates it. It is the Other that 
partially constitutes the self because of identity: indeed, the Other can claim a stake in another’s self 
because without the Other, there would be no identity. As Diana Fuss observes, “to the extent that 
identity al-ways contains the spector [sic] of non-identity within it, the [embodied] subject . . . is 
always divided and identity is always purchased at the price of exclusion of the Other, the repression 
or repudiation of non-identity” (1989: 102–103). Therefore, while subjects may only truly know their 
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own self, one of the fundamental paradoxes of being is the lack of distinct selfhood without an Other 
(a not-“I”), to define against; “[i]f ‘I’ only exist by virtue of my difference from ‘you,’ then ‘you’ are a 
necessary part of my constructed being, and ‘I’ can no longer claim ...sovereign individuality” (Shildrick 
1997:112). Because we cannot truly know the Other firsthand, we also cannot fully apprehend the 
aspects of our own identity that are constituted by the Other. The potential horror of identity 
articulated by the pure moment of murder then literalizes the problem that the always-already 
present Other disrupts self-integrity. An-other terror is that identity itself—that which is most 
privately ours—is a condition of our sociality. Shildrick (1997: 10) contends that “the boundaries of 
exclusion are never wholly secure against the threat of the absent other to disrupt the unity and 
definition of the selfsame,” thereby problematizing the reading of the body as a “discrete entity.” 
Identity, then, is only half the story. The self is not just bounded by the metaphysical inner-distinction 
of identity, but also by the physical body: both borders work together to delimit where the self begins 
and ends. Cartesian philosophy distinguishes between these two, resulting in two modes of self. This 
stance must be flawed—and Alweiss (2009: 415) observes that “[m]odern neuroscience and 
phenomenology” agree with this conclusion — because the self is always-already embodied, and 
thinking is tied into sensory experience.3 Descartes’ separation of mind and body is thus too extreme. 
Even if we agree that some aspect of experience is non-physical, and cannot be accessed by others 
firsthand, our experiences are still always-already embodied. In fact, embodiment and the limits of 
perceptive ability permit us to have such an inner-life. In order for that privacy to have meaning, to be 
distinctive or be perceivable, we first have to have Others to distinguish ourselves from. The self, 
being contingent on identity, is thus tied into sociality (see Erneling 2009: 174-175; McGann and De 
Jaegher 2009:427). 
As McGann and De Jaegher note, “[t]he body provides a basis for the agent’s perspective but that 
perspective cannot be reduced to biology” (2009: 433). In my view, identity is vital in order to avoid 
such biological reductionism.4 Identity (subjectivity, the part of self experienced only by the subject) 
al-lows individuals to recognize themselves as unique entities. The integrity of the body barrier 
functions to symbolically delimit the individual’s experiential field, acting as a symbolic as well as 
physical barrier that defines the self as whole and separate from Others. Thus, when the integrity of 
the body is compromised, identity is also violated. It is in this sense that the body is more than simply a 
vehicle for the “real,” mental self: it is fundamental to our sense of being. 
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I find de Vignemont’s (2007) model of the body as an object “owned” by the subject unsatisfying, then, 
because it implies that the body is separate to “the self” (implied to be mental).5 The separation of 
these two is an illusion partially based in vision, because the body represents the self, both to Others and 
to the subject (see Carruthers 2009:126,128–129). That visual illusion, which is fundamental to the 
reading of bodies as symbolic representations in cinema, is consolidated by the way in which we 
perceive ourselves and Others as individuals defined by bodies. Lacan ([1966] 2006) conceived of that 
sense of self-apprehension as problematic because it means envisaging one-self as an integral unit only 
from a distance (as a reflection). Galen Strawson (1997) uses the physicality of the body to make a case 
that the mind has a material presence, but in my view this undersells the representational and con-
ceptual value of the physical body: that is, how the body functions to stand in for our own and others’ 
identities.6 It is less important in my view to consider the mind as object than it is to consider the 
emblematic work the body does in representing those aspects of self that are not readily accessible to 
or in Others. 
 
Representing the Self-Other Paradigm in Horror Film 
Following Peter Strawson, Seemann observes that “perceptual experiences of other persons” are crucial 
as “the perceptual experience itself constitutes an understanding of the other as a minded creature” 
(2009: 512), because our experiences are limited to our bodies. Perceptual access to Others’ bodies is our 
means, in this view, of assessing that other beings experience selfhood in the same way we experience 
our own self firsthand.7 As R. Bruce Elder theorizes, “[m]y body is the source of all my personal 
knowledge.” The cinematic body is thus an image through which we can appositely “express our beliefs 
about ourselves,” even if, like the body, these notions are “contradictory ... some-times beautiful and 
sometimes horrible and sometimes simultaneously both” (Elder 1997: 22–23). This is certainly the case 
when disfigured, psychopathic murderers are caught in the pure moment with their typically youthful, 
beautiful prey in the slasher film (Sipos 2010: 62; see also Clover 1993: 30, 32, 42).8 
The body, as both representative image of self and the object of deconstruction in the horror film, is 
central to these concerns. The skin boundary signifies bodily unity and the segregation of that unit 
from other bodies. The body also delineates the subject’s transience. Simply put, because the self is 
embodied, we are biologically vulnerable: visceral horror presents that fragility as a source of terror. In 
opening the body, the mechanisms of life it-self are revealed and destroyed, emphasizing that 
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vulnerability. The visual de-construction of one individual by another in this graphic manner in horror 
also works on a symbolic level in my view. Our knowledge of the Other is limited by our embodiment, 
and even our access to our own body is incomplete in the sense that we understand that bodies are 
biological organisms, but rarely encounter firsthand the complex homeostatic processes that maintain 
corporeal functionality. In the pure moment of murder, one body is opened, exposing those processes 
(causing their failure). This action figuratively stands in for the paradoxes arising from embodiment 
and the self-Other contingency 
This is not to suggest that horror narratives support a quest for solipsistic autonomy; that the self 
simply seeks or desires to eradicate all Others. This would, after all, lead also to the redundancy of the 
killer’s identity. One implicit release offered in these moments could be a destruction of the barriers 
between self and Other. However, these are not moments of relief: the figures are brought together 
via violence, and that awfulness, I argue, is apposite be-cause it symbolizes the impossibility of such 
collusion. In horror, and particularly in slasher and torture porn films, the insistence with which 
murder occurs means that the self is continually attacked by the Others that surround it. This, to me, 
reflects the nightmare that we are social beings, yet there are Others in the world who value our 
existence so little that they are willing to harm or even destroy us. 
The slasher-killer, often masked, rarely vocal, is a one-dimensional misanthropic machine. The same is 
true of the backwoods degenerates present in, for example, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre movies (six 
films, made between 1974 and 2006), The Hills Have Eyes films (four films, made between 1977 and 
2007), the Wrong Turn series (three films, made between 2003 and 2009), Timber Falls (2007), and 
Carver (2008) to name but a few examples. Because they often have little sense of identity that we 
can perceive (because their only social gesture is violence), there is little for them to risk in ridding 
the world of their Others. They have no stake in the self-Other contingency. The killer does not share 
the same field of consciousness as the “normal” subject, making the victim a more likely point of 
identification for the audience. The audience thus see their own self-vulnerability meta/physically 
endangered by these killers. 
These concerns are pivotal for The Texas Chainsaw Massacre: The Beginning (2006), which acts as an 
indicative point of summation concluding this section. The first of the teens to be killed, Eric, has his 
face removed by Tommy (Leatherface), who wears the skin as a mask. When he looks in the mirror to 
see his “new” face, the pure moment of Eric’s death reveals an inextricability of self and Other that is 
augmented by the cannibalizing of Eric’s body later in the film. Eric and Tommy (victim and killer) 
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become unified externally via the mask, and internally via the consumption of his flesh, resonating 
from their connection in the pure moment. The cannibalism is paralleled by an incident prior to the 
murder; Eric, looking in his van’s wing-mirror, notes that it is broken. The crack running the length of 
the mirror cuts directly across Eric’s reflection, cruelly echoing the later incident of Tommy wearing 
his face: the literal fissure of the mirror symbolically echoes Tommy’s inability to define self and Other. 
This is the source of Tommy’s homicidal rage, and thus the narrative’s horror is motivated by the 
blurring of self and Other. 
 
Killer/Victim, or Killer [slash] Victim: The Symbolic Function in Contact Murder 
Sequences 
In moments of conjunction where the victim and murderer are visually intertwined, their roles are 
defined (until this time, their positions are only potential, however inevitable they may seem). 
Indeed, it is in this moment that the victim becomes memorable, attaining a unique identity.9 We are 
interconnected as social creatures, but that interdependence threatens our sense of unique identity: in 
horror, that threat is turned into a nightmare vision as one self is attacked by another. The body is 
crucial in cinema, as it represents a distinct individual(ity). In the instance of murder, the bodily 
borders that visually and symbolically separate the two selves are compromised, or subjected to 
disruption. 
At the moment in which two bodies interact visually in the cinema of homicide, their narratologically 
determined self-roles come into fruition (their fullest expression). It is only in the pure moment of 
murder that these positions are finally enacted rather than preconstructed. For a split second, the 
killer is inseparable from victim; their bodies are one, however fleetingly. I contend that this 
manifests the dependency of self and Other, be-cause it is at this point that the figures come to attain 
their identities as “killer” and “victim.” The fact that this identification process results in death 
manifests a philosophical conundrum underpinning identity formation. That the joining of the two 
figures culminates in the eradication of one party suggests that the joining of self and Other 
paradoxically entails the consolidation and failure of identity. This is why the visual motif of adjoined 
bodies is so crucial to the symbolic meaning of the pure moment: if two selves were co-joined in the 
way they are visually during the pure moment, the “I” that signifies one identity would no longer be 
exclusive. 
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This melding is the nightmarish reversal of the trust involved in joint action. Seemann describes such 
interdependence by envisaging the dual moment and co-operation of dancers; “[t]o the observer, it 
does not seem that two persons are adapting their movements to one another. They really are acting in 
unison . . . acting as one” (2009: 500–503). Although this sense of co-operation does not erase “one’s 
awareness of oneself,” in the case of the pure moment, that is the result because it entails the 
erasure of one party. That ability to distinguish is also affected by form: while Seemann describes the 
experience of performing as one of the parties, a different problem arises from watching two figures 
who are reduced to two dimensions (onscreen), and whose bodily boundaries are obscured by gore. 
In fact, this possibility of melding between self and Other, which is exaggerated in the filmic context, 
is hinted toward in Seemann’s discussion of “joint control,” inasmuch as “there is a way in which I can 
be said to possess immediate control over your doings (and you over mine) in a joint action” (2009: 
505). In the pure moment, this coupling arises from a generic agreement on the roles of victim and 
killer. 
A number of films play with the interaction, creating slippage between killers and victims that 
emphasizes their reciprocity. Killers too are subjected to victimization, as is the case with my opening 
example of Freddy and Nancy. The killer must be laid to rest to complete the narrative arc. That 
restorative balance blurs the roles of killer and victim by creating two parallel pure moments that 
reverse the dynamic (Freddy becomes Nancy’s victim). Similarly, in Last House on the Left (2009), 
Paige (a teen victim) is murdered by Krug and Francis in a three-person pure moment. The two men 
stab Paige (one cutting her abdomen, the other knifing her back) in an intimate framing that captures 
all three characters in a collusion of homicide. Later in the film, Francis and Krug are murdered by 
John and Emma Collingwood (parents of Paige’s friend Mari) in parallel pure-moment shots that echo 
this original crime. Emma is presented in a two-shot, stabbing Francis in the front, then John (in 
another two-shot) lodges a hammer-claw into the back of Francis’s head. The couple violently assault 
Krug in a similar fashion, Emma attacking him from the front with a fire extinguisher, and John from 
behind with a poker. Both events (the effects) aesthetically evoke Paige’s pure moment (the cause, 
which is being avenged). This methodology optically concretizes concerns raised by the narrative and 
characters: the innocent parents become homicidal. The lines between victim and victimizer are 
blurred in the incidents of slaughter, both visually and in terms of their character arcs. 
Given the generic context, the roles of killer and victim are accepted as naturalistic identity roles. 
Horror distills a view of the world offered in Schopenhauer’s assertion that the wickedness and 
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misery of human existence “balance one another” as a kind of “eternal justice.” These fictional 
instances help us “begin to understand why everything that lives must atone for its existence first by 
living and then by dying” (Schopenhauer 1970:140). Pure moments are unique inasmuch as they 
simultaneously symbolize life/presence, and the destruction of being. Although we need not perceive 
our own existences as the kind of brutal self-versus-other struggle that Schopenhauer suggests, horror 
amplifies the quest for identity into a battleground, and, in doing so, literalizes the underlying 
implications of individualism. 
 
Variations on the Pure Moment 
The pure moment highlights one of the central themes of the horror film, namely the self-Other 
relationship. The pure moment is a visual motif that expresses the complex tensions underpinning 
identity: in particular, that the Other simultaneously affirms and jeopardizes the integrity of self. 
Though ubiquitous in the cinema of homicide, the pure moment is not just presented in the direct 
two-shot form I have examined thus far. In this final section I consider variations on the pure moment, 
each of which develops in its own way the horrors of identity raised by the self-Other paradigm. 
The implications are somewhat different if, for example, the moment is removed (as in the censored 
version of Friday the 13th [1980]),10 or absent (for example, the kills occur during cut-away shots 
throughout Scream Bloody Murder (2000), and the same is true when Wade is slaughtered in Friday 
the 13th [2009]). The moment is implied in these cases, and thus cannot signal the fulfillment that 
the slasher or torture porn film allots to physical violence. Murder is the plot: if the narrative is 
designed for, yet is unable to show this moment, the build to homicide (the doomed life of the 
victim), the finality of that character (suffering and death) could become meaningless. 
That said, the moment might be only suggested when theme and character require, and especially 
when technique can create an experience as vivid and meaningful as the pure moment. The ancestor 
of the Slasher film, Psycho (1960), for example, is designed to playfully avoid the pure moment, and 
that decision is appropriate given the relationships between Norman, Mother, and their victims. In the 
shower sequence, shots infamously converge to present an illusion of explicit carnage through a 
culmination of near static instances. The pure moment itself is lost amid the montage of non-contact 
shots: the single moment of contact (where the knife tip breaks the abdominal skin) is present, but is 
swept over. This symbolically evokes the sense in which Norman participates in the killing: he is an 
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Other to himself and so is not responsible for slaying Marion. In a sense he (like the contact shot) is 
present, but we are given the impression that something else (or someone else) is the focal point: it 
may be Norman piercing Marion’s flesh with the knife tip, but what we perceive is Mother committing 
an act of brutal homicide. The murder is constructed by misassessment of the composite images, 
meaning the viewer has to decode the juxtaposed shots. The spectator is thus an accomplice of sorts, 
participating in the construction of an impression of the murder. In parallel, Norman too becomes an 
accomplice to what he perceives as his Mother’s crime by disposing of Marion’s body. 
Psycho, then, presents us with another of our philosophical issues: the coherence of a singular 
individuality being defined by the borders of an individual body.11 The shower scene avoids pure 
moment contact because Norman and Marion are not meant to be unified in murder, as Norman is not 
the killer (psychologically speaking); he is a conduit for another identity. More akin to a pure moment 
is the image at the end of the film in which Mrs. Bates’s face is superimposed over Norman’s, a 
combination that quickly dissolves into the image of Marion’s car (containing her body) being dragged 
from the swamp. The physical distances between these three bodies (Norman, Mother, and Marion) 
are accentuated by the fact that each is locked away: Norman in the asylum, Marion in the car, 
Mother in the cellar (the image used during the dissolve is taken from the earlier scene in which her 
corpse is discovered). Yet the dissolve collapses those distances, both visually and symbolically, 
paralleling these physical distances with the psychological distance that closes between Norman and 
his Mother. In fully “becoming” Mother in this final sequence, Norman evades taking conscious 
responsibility for Marion’s murder. That results in the destruction of the Norman aspect of his self, 
who is replaced by the Mother persona, the murderous will that overcomes him. Yet the destruction of 
Norman’s self is visually intertwined with the consequences of his actions in this final moment of the 
film as we witness the melding of Norman, Mother, and Marion in a single dissolve. It is here that 
the relationship between the three is finally manifested: that Norman’s two selves unite and then 
merge with the victim in a dissolve that obliterates the single self of the victim amidst the 
overwhelming force of the now single Other. 
Another technique employed in filming murder is to deny the visual presence of the killer in the 
moment. In A Nightmare on Elm Street (1984), for ex-ample, Freddy is never shown slaying a teen, 
because slaughter is inflicted on their bodies from within. His bodily disfigurement clearly marks him 
as the teens’ ultimate Other. Yet this overt bodily difference is balanced by his symbolic relationship 
with the teens: he is a figurative presence for the majority of the film, who emerges from their 
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unconscious. He is the Otherness within, the internalized Other, the object of their dreams and 
nightmares that both defines and threatens to destroy them. He does not need to be portrayed ex-
plicitly victimizing externally because the film focuses on the teens’ night-mares (their inner-
perspective). Accordingly, the nightmare in which Tina is stalked by Freddy lasts four times longer 
than the scene in which she is physically harmed (where Freddy is not shown). It is the symbolic self-
Other relationship that is manifested in the nightmare sequences. In this case, murder is more 
intimate than bodily contact; it erupts from within, unto the victims’ bodies. The result of 
confronting the Other is the destruction of the victim’s body. In A Nightmare on Elm Street, the 
moment of murder is the externalization of the individual’s internalized Otherness, which helps 
constitute their identity. That exposure destroys the self; the invisible Other explodes from within 
the self.12 
We find a more recent variation on the pure moment in the “traps” of the Saw series. Although in 
Saw (2004) Amanda is forced into a hands-on pure moment, having to cut a key out of her cellmate’s 
stomach in order to free herself from the reverse bear trap on her head, the series revolves around a 
central notion that individuals are coerced into becoming murderers. The real killer is Jigsaw (John), 
who places victims in situations whereby they have the choice only to kill or be killed. This motif is 
augmented in the cases of Jeff (Saw III), Rigg (Saw IV), and William (Saw VI), all of whom undergo 
tests whereby they witness rather than directly instigate the violence; they have to choose whether to 
stop the killing (enacted by mechanical trap), or decide  which  victim  to  condemn. Here, then, the 
killer is absent (replaced by a machine), and the witness becomes a distanced murderer by proxy. 
Death ensues, and the pure moment is driven by the same theoretical interactions as in the two-shot 
pure moment. In the original Saw the victim is forced to confront her willingness to preserve the self 
at the expense of the Other—Jigsaw compels the victims to eradicate Others in order to save them-
selves. The futility of this action— the dangers inherent in defining the self at the cost of the Other—
is made clear in Saw V where the two surviving victims out of a group of five realize that they were 
expected to work together rather than kill each other in order to complete the test. 
This narrative set-up significantly complicates the victim/killer relation-ship, even if the gruesome 
detail of suffering appears to compensate for the murderer’s partial absence. In all of these variations 
of the pure moment, the apparent physical distances between victim and killer—be they psychological 
(as in the case of Psycho’s Norman Bates), or physical (as in Saw)—are based on proximities and 
distances between self and Other. Just as there is a symbolic and visual slippage between two only 
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apparently separate bodies in the two-shot pure moment, in the instances I have described here it is 
still not possible to separate self from Other. 
A final point worth noting is how the pure moment can vary within a particular film, and how those 
changes inform our engagement with the homicidal action. In the slasher film, it is clear that the 
death of each victim is narratologically important in the sense that it spurs the film toward the over-
throw of the killer’s regime. However, in some cases the manner of presenting each victim’s passing 
also plays a role in the development and larger totality of the work’s impact. In Friday the 13th (2009) 
the dominant mode of portraying murder shifts as the film progresses. In early cases (those of Wade 
and Mikey), the victim is killed offscreen and revealed after the fact. This mode gradually changes: 
when Richie, Nolan, and Chelsea are slaughtered, they are present onscreen in the moment of death 
while the killer remains offscreen. The majority of later killings (Lawrence, Bracke, Bree, Trent, and 
Chewie) are quite intimate, framed in tight two-shots involving both victim and killer. These shifts 
occur as an increasing number of teens are dispatched, meaning the accumulating loss of life has 
direct impact on the film’s method of portraying murder. 
Both slasher and torture porn films are driven by acts of murder. Yet the message of these films, despite 
focusing on and centralizing interactions as horrific, ultimately suggests that the apparent paradoxes of 
identity formation are inescapable (much like the killers). I contend that rather than operating based 
on misanthropic pleasure, horror films of this kind symbolically process some of these problems. They 
do not necessarily resolve them, or even explicitly discuss them in the narrative. Nevertheless, I 
suggest that horror films routinely work through the same problems raised by philosophy regarding 
the self, even if those notions are articulated in a very different mode and on a figurative level. As I 
have been attempting to demonstrate throughout this article, the notions that Otherness is part of 
selfhood, and that our bodies necessarily separate us from one another are horrors of the human 
condition that find apposite expression in the pure moment of murder. 
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Notes 
1As categorizing labels, “slasher” and “torture porn” are distinct from one another: the 
implications differ. The reason I use both here is because in practice, the boundaries between 
the two sub-genres are more porous than the terminology would suggest: a number of the films 
dubbed as torture porn have evolved from slasher film franchises, such as the  Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre films (1974–2006) (Johnson 2007; Thompson 2007; Rodriguez 2009). Also, some 
pundits have recognized that the lineage of torture porn descends directly from the slasher 
franchises of the 1980s (Williams 2006; Safire 2007; Thompson 2007; Zinoman 2007), not least 
because both sub-genres dwell on a set-piece structure that centralizes homicide. Thus, the 
combination of these two sub-genres provides coherence to my current study, allowing me to 
compare the contemporary horror film with its forbearers. Throughout, I draw on slasher 
criticism (which remains one of the most attended to sub-genres of horror in terms of academic 
research), because torture porn remains, as yet, undertheorized: my forthcoming monograph 
on torture porn will seek to rectify that issue. 
2 See, for example, my own 2011 essay. For a detailed critical discussion of the Cartesian model of 
selfhood and rape, see Brison (2002). 
3 Here I disagree with McMahan’s contention that “our identity is a function of” the capacity 
for consciousness resulting from mind-body dualism (see Degrazia 2003: 414). I concur with 
Schectman (1997) that embodiment is a prerequisite for experience. 
4 My uses of “self” and “identity” here differ to the way McGann and De Jaegher employ  them 
(2009: 432). 
5 If we conceive of the body as part of the self, as part of the identity process, as part of  what 
allows us to form an identity that is separate from others, there is no problem of ownership. 
Ownership only becomes an issue if we seek to separate physical from mental experience, which 
cannot be as we are always-already embodied in order to experience. 
6 See also Degrazia’s (2003:420–421) criticism of McMahan, which is founded on the assumption 
that the mind is problematic if we view the self from the materialist perspective. My critique of 
Degrazia’s stance is that consciousness is a state rather than a substance. Even if we were to 
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assume that consciousness is supported by physical properties of an organ, the brain can be 
thought of as existing in one of two states: that is, able or unable to support consciousness. 
7 For discussion of the development of such awareness in infancy, see Baron-Cohen et al. 1993; 
Gopnik 1993; Masangkay et al. 1974. 
8 It is worth iterating at this stage that both male and female slasher victims are typically 
beautiful and youthful: this is not a remark aimed at establishing a gender binary.  
9 Lake Crane identifies the homogeneity of “anonymous,” “faceless masses” in favor of  “the 
manner in which untold victims perish” (1994:145, 148, 151). Saplonsky and Moilitor (1996: 46) 
note that moments that offend viewer sensibilities (such as murder) are more likely to be 
remembered. 
10 Friday the 13th was released in Britain in an uncut format in 2003; previously it was only 
available to the UK market in a highly censored format, which removed most of the  graphic 
violence. 
11 In Locke’s Cartesian paradigm, this is envisaged as a case of a single spirit being as-signed to 
each individual body (see Campbell 1970:45). 
12 This is a motif that would be worth exploring via other horror sub-genres. The demonic 
possession narrative—exemplified famously by The Exorcist (1973) and more recently by The Last 
Exorcism (2010)—would be worth considering in terms of a worth considering is the alien 
narrative where human bodies are infected by foreign bodies: most famously, this occurs in the 
Alien series. Although demon figures retain the rudiments of anthropomorphism, in the case of 
aliens infiltrating the bodies of human organisms, the problem is that the pure moment 
becomes a visceral interruption of self whereby the Other is literally designed as wholly foreign. 
Mulhall (2002) explores the series in relation to the philosophy of self; investigating how the 
pure moment operates in such films would present a way in which to develop this subject . 
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